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Conrad Delbert Seaman* 
 
 
There has been ongoing international debate regarding the patentability of 
software for at least 15 years.  Despite being bound by international laws, 
which deal directly with the patentability of software (TRIPS), individual 
countries continue to justify vastly different legislative and practical patent 
regimes in this field of innovation.  In a very traditional and conservative 
fashion Canada has placed itself carefully on the fence in this debate adopting 
an approach which falls somewhere between that of the U.S. and Europe, 
providing little practical guidance for businesses, lawyers or software 
developers in the industry.  This paper seeks to establish an approach, 
solution and justification for the correction of these problems. 
Discussion in the area of software patents is often based substantially 
around patent law theory and statistical analysis.  Such approaches disregard 
the context in which these laws operate.  As a direct consequence the 
connection between software patents and innovation remains an area of 
substantial conjecture.  As the basis for policy decisions this non-contextual 
approach leaves much to be desired.  In Canada this situation is amplified by 
                                                          
* Conrad Seaman is the technical lead and Senior Forum Editor for the Osgoode Hall 
Review of Law and Policy. He holds a B.Math in Computer Science from the 
University of Waterloo and a Juris Doctorate from Osgoode Hall Law School. Prior to 
law school he worked in the software development and advertising industries as a 
technical contractor and project manager for over five years.  Conrad also studied 
philosophy in his undergrad and holds a religious studies minor.  Conrad is articling 
with an IP boutique on Bay St. and intends to focus on technology transfer, patents 
and intellectual property licensing during his career. 
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the fact that few significant efforts have been made to study the legal effects 
of patents on the Canadian software sector.   
Recognizing the gap between theory and practice this paper seeks to 
marry the academic debate over software patentability with concrete 
Canadian perspectives from inside the industry.  To this end primary 
research based on personal interviews with representatives from three 
software companies, with innovation offices in Canada, is used to shed a 
contextual, Canadian and practical light on U.S. and EU patent law theory. 
The trend which emerged from these interviews was that Canadian software 
companies generally find software patents detrimental to their business 
objectives.  Given the small sample size, confirmation of this trend within 
the broader Canadian software industry is not possible and further research is 
required in order to substantiate this papers recommendations.  However, 
assuming that the software companies interviewed are representative of the 
Canadian software industry then the detrimental trend identified aligns the 
Canadian software industry with non-innovation theories of software 
patentability.  This allows the paper to justifiably conclude that Canada 
should not extend patentability to software or in the alternative that a 
carefully considered extension of patent law which responds systemically to 
the unique needs of the software industry and other emerging technologies 
may be appropriate.  Most importantly the paper stresses the practical 
importance of active contextual research during the development of clear 
and strong guidelines related to the patentability of software in Canada 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over time patent law has continually increased its range of 
influence and with each expansion debate over its merits and value 
has never been far behind.1  In the software development sector there 
has been ongoing international debate regarding patentability for at 
least 15 years.2  In most cases debate on such topics normally gives 
way to general acceptance as the value of patents becomes recognized 
in the newly enveloped sector.3  This has arguably not occurred in the 
software industry.  Despite being bound by international laws, which 
deal directly with the patentability of software, individual countries 
continue to justify vastly different legislative and practical approaches 
                                                          
1 Edith Tilton Penrose, The Economics of the International Patent System, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1951). Penrose shows that industry in the 17th and 18th century 
vehemently opposed the patenting of mechanical devices. 
2 Cases in the U.S. including Re: Alappat, 33 F.3d 1562 (1994) and State Street Bank v. 
Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (1998) triggered significant debate as the 
U.S. committed to its approach on software patentability. 
3 Supra note 1.  As an example the vehicle industry, initially opposed to patenting, 
became one of its principle advocates in a period of less than 10 years. 
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to the problem.4  In a very traditional and conservative fashion 
Canada has placed itself carefully on the fence in this debate adopting 
an approach which falls somewhere between that of the U.S. and 
Europe.  The result is best described as a non-position on software 
patentability providing little practical guidance for businesses, lawyers 
or innovators in the industry.   
Discourse in the sphere of software patents is predominantly 
focused on the approaches of the U.S. and EU due in large part to both 
their size and economic influence as well as the divergence of their 
solutions.  Furthermore, discussion is often based substantially around 
patent law theory and statistical analysis.  Such an approach disregards 
the context in which these laws operate.5  As a direct consequence the 
connection between software patents and innovation remains an area 
of substantial conjecture.  As the basis for policy decisions this non-
contextual approach leaves much to be desired.  In Canada this 
situation is amplified as few significant efforts have been made to 
study the legal effects of patents on our software sector.6   
Recognizing the gap between theory and practice this paper 
seeks to marry the academic debate over software patentability with 
concrete Canadian perspectives from inside the industry.  It is the 
author’s hope that this investigation will create a more stable practical 
foundation for legislative and policy based decision making in the 
future.7  To this end the paper proceeds in five parts.  In part one 
Canada’s basic handling of software patents is examined - revealing a 
very undecided approach with far ranging practical consequences for 
numerous parties.  This weak position, along with a dearth of 
Canadian based discourse in this area, leads the paper, in part two, to a 
comparative learning exercise involving the examination of U.S. and 
EU approaches to patent law.  This establishes two paradoxically 
                                                          
4 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), WTO, 15 April 1994, 
Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization at 
27(1).   
5 James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, “An Empirical Look at Software Patents” (2007) 16 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 157 at 171.  
6 Due to its size, relative to the US, the sector has been dismissed as irrelevant in the 
academic, practical and legislative spheres.  Interview of Legal Staff at Faskin 
Martineau (March 15, 2008).  
7 For example, the currently proposed revisions to MOPOP Chapter 13 – Computer 
Implemented Inventions.  See http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00758.html. 
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divergent approaches operating under the international Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) treaty.8  Having established 
no clear policy direction via this comparison the paper turns, in part 
three, to an examination of the academic and theoretical discourse in 
this area.  Strong arguments on either side of the patent innovation 
debate are examined but no clear answer emerges providing the paper 
with the impetus for a contextual investigation.  Part four responds by 
examining the question of innovation from the perspective of three 
software companies with research and development offices in Canada.  
The trend which emerges is that Canadian software companies 
generally find software patents detrimental to their business 
objectives.  Given the small sample size, confirmation of this trend 
within the broader Canadian software industry is not possible and 
further research is required in order to substantiate this papers 
recommendations.  However, assuming that the perspectives of the 
software companies considered are representative of the Canadian 
software industry then the detrimental trend identified aligns the 
Canadian software industry with the non-innovation theories of 
software patentability explored in part three. By aligning this research 
with the legal and theoretical explorations undertaken previously the 
paper provides itself with the justification required for part five in 
which two potential policy responses are advocated, mainly: the 
exclusion of software from patentability or a carefully considered 
extension of patent law which responds systemically to the unique 
needs of the software industry.  Most importantly, this paper 
establishes that before adopting a positive software patent regime the 
patent office, judiciary and legislature must present a clear and unified 
opinion based on the active contextual research of Canada’s software 
industry and its relationship with patent law.  The paper therefore 
establishes an approach, solution and justification for the correction of 
Canada’s software patentability debate. 
 
1.0 CANADA’S SOFTWARE PATENT PROBLEM 
 This section first introduces the core principles of patent law 
and how these core tenets affect software patentability.  It then 
examines Canada’s approach to software patents and the impact this 
has on the principle stakeholders in the software and legal industries. 
                                                          
8 Supra note 4. 
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1.1 Patents Generally 
 In Canada the Patent Act provides the legal mechanisms 
through which patents are reviewed, granted and protected.9  Patent 
law is viewed as a bargain between inventors and the state – in 
exchange for the inventor’s full disclosure of the invention, the 
inventor is given an exclusive right to prevent others from making, 
selling, or using the invention for a fixed term.  This bargain is viewed 
as a way to “…stimulate the creation and development of new 
technologies”.10  As such the notion of innovation tends to be the 
principle justification for patent regimes and is at the root of the 
software patentability debate.   
 Patent law was developed in Florence Italy and the pioneering 
Italian statute of 1478 introduced a set of core principles which form 
the basis of modern patent law today.11  In Canada the Italian ideology 
is broken into four components: statutory subject matter, novelty, 
inventiveness and usefulness.  To be patentable an idea and its 
implementation must meet all of the tests which flow from these 
tenets.  The statutory subject requirement means that an invention 
must fall within the range of subjects which a state defines as 
patentable.  Under Canadian patent we exclude from patentability all 
abstract theorems or mere scientific principles.12  Novelty means that 
an invention must be original and not previously disclosed to the 
public.  This requirement gives rise to the notion of prior art, that is 
disclosures to the public, to which patent examiners and inventors 
must be particularly wary.13  Inventiveness is defined in Canada as 
that which would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the 
art.14  Finally utility continues to be a vague concept in Canadian 
patent law as it is not defined by our statute.  Courts have sometimes 
interpreted this to mean that a patent must have economic 
                                                          
9 Canadian Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c P-4. 
10 David Vaver, Essentials of Canadian Law: Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, 
Patents, Trademarks (Concorde Ontario: Irwin Law Concorde Ontario, 1997) at 113. 
11 Ikechi Mgbeoji, Global Biopiracy: Patents, Plants and Indigenous Knowledge, 
(Vanvouver: UBC Press, 2006) at 16. 
12 Supra note 9 at s.27(8). 
13 Supra note 9 at s.28.2. 
14 Supra note 9 at s.28.3. 
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consequences, though others have taken a more liberal approach 
relying on the patent application itself to define its own utility.    
 
1.2 Software Patents  
In Canada software patents are not a specific form of patent, 
but rather the term simply identifies patents which use, or are related 
to, computer software.  As such, software patents must still meet the 
traditional tests for statutory subject matter, novelty, inventiveness 
and utility.  These core elements present some unique challenges in 
this field of innovation.   
From a purely statutory perspective abstract theories, 
including mathematical ones, are excluded from patentability under 
Canadian law.  However, there is no distinction, other than 
representation, between computer code, and mathematics.  Software 
and computer code are simply human readable implementations of 
lambda calculus – a form of pure mathematics. The famous Church-
Turing thesis established in 1936 that any computer function is simply 
the equivalent of a mathematical expression.15   Thus, although 
computer programs are not explicitly excluded by Canadian patent 
law, there is a convincing argument that they fall dangerously close to 
the abstract theory exception.  It helps to imagine, as developed by 
Ben Klemens, a spectrum of inventions.  At one end we can place 
patentable physical machines made of transistors and diodes; at the 
other end we can place pure un-patentable math.  Policy should select 
a clear dividing line between the patentable and the un-patentable at 
some point in this spectrum.16 Problematically, separating machine 
from math rapidly becomes a grayscale exercise as they are often 
intimately related to one another.17 
Novelty also presents an interesting problem.  In most cases 
novelty is interpreted by Canadian patent examiners as requiring a 
thorough search of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) 
                                                          
15 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Back: An Eternal Golden Braid, (New York: 
Basic Books, 1979) at 428. 
16 Ben Klemens, Math You Can’t Use (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 2006) at 
44. 
17 Grayscale is reference to both the 256 shades of gray traditionally recognized by 
computers, though almost indistinguishable by humans, as well as the shades of grey 
dividing machine from math in the sphere of software. 
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databases.  The USPTO is recognized as the world’s single largest 
prior-art resource and though prior-art searches should proceed 
further the cost and expediency requirements of patent examinations 
usually make this impossible.18  Problematically software development 
and innovation has been occurring for much longer than we have had 
software patents.  As a result prior-art in this field exists in a 
multitude of places.19 
The vagueness of utility in Canadian patent law also creates 
difficulties as the product of a software program is not normally 
tangible.  Unlike industrial patents where the monopoly is against a 
manufacturing process a software patent is held against a method or 
mathematical implementation of a concept.  These ideas can be 
realized by anyone with access to a home computer.  This raises the 
question of whether patents, which were intended to promote 
industrial innovation through economic incentives, have any role in 
constraining the actions of individuals.20  
The requirement of inventiveness has a close link with that of 
novelty.  The test for obviousness is a highly subjective one based 
around the “skilled person in the art”.21  As a relatively new field of 
technology computers are often bewildering to the average user – but 
to a skilled person in the art most software development is the obvious 
implementation of logical decision making processes.  Worse still is 
the fact that most software development is simply the modification of 
existing prior art - an infinite regression of ideas built upon other 
ideas with no discernable starting point.22  In computer science this is 
called code re-use and it is part of the developer’s creed.  Patenting 
software therefore means one patents a multitude of previous works 
with implications both up and down the innovation chain. 
   
                                                          
18 Supra note 16 at 74. 
19 Grant C. Yang, “The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source 
Movement” (2004) 13 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 171 at 186. 
20 Russell McOrmond, “A Review of Software Patent Issues, Digital Copyright 
Canada” online:<http://www.flora.ca/patent2003/software-patent2003.shtml>. 
21 Beloit v. Valmet Oy, [1986] 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289. 
22 Stephen Hawking,  A Brief History of Time, (New York: Bantam Book, 1988). 
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1.3 Canada’s Basic Non-Position 
The foregoing establishes that there are some conceptual 
problems with simply applying existing patent law definitions to 
computer software.  Canada is not alone in attempting to recognize 
these theoretical difficulties.  The result, however, is a disjunction 
between the legislative, practical and judicial treatment of patent laws 
as they apply to computer software. 23 
From 1978 to 2005 the Canadian patent office adopted the 
official position that patents for computer programs were not 
appropriate based on fears that they would hinder progress in an 
emerging field.24  In 2005 the Manual of Patent Office Practice 
(MoPOP) was amended substantially, effectively reversing this 
position in a two phase re-interpretation of the Patent Act’s statutory 
subject matter exception.25  First, section 12.04.05 of MoPOP was 
added – holding that computer programs would be considered 
statutory subject matter so long as they were “… integrated with 
traditionally patentable subject matter”.  In addition to this 
categorization of software MoPOP introduced chapter 16 - an entirely 
new chapter on computer implemented inventions.  In the context of 
software innovations only chapter 16 further clarifies the statutory 
definitions used in chapter 12 emphasizing that traditionally 
patentable subject matter may include not only physical 
implementations and results but any “…essentially economic result 
relating to trade, industry or commerce”.26  Then finally in a caveat it 
notes that this “economic result” requirement is not met simply by 
performing calculations producing useful information – thereby 
arguably excluding most traditional software programs.   
Further changes to chapter 12 of MoPOP were introduced in 
2009 and changes to chapter 16 of MoPOP are currently pending.  As 
of this writing Chapters 12 and 16 of MoPOP do not accord with one 
another.  However, the emerging subject matter requirement for 
computer programs appears to be that “the device must provide a 
                                                          
23 The EU has been left in a vastly similar position as explored in part 2.3. 
24 Supra note 10 at 129. 
25 “Canadian Intellectual Property Office - Manual of Patent Office Practice”, March 
2007 at c.12 and c.16.  MoPOP is a non-binding practical guide for practitioners and 
patent examiners which helps to explore the interpretation of the Canadian Patent 
Act. 
26 Ibid. at c. 16.03.02. 
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novel and inventive technological solution to a technological 
problem”.27   
Even for professionals the resulting legal terrain is far from 
clear.  Lawyers with Bereskin and Parr, a leading Canadian 
intellectual property firm, opined recently that the MoPOP’s 
clarifications mean little without additional jurisprudence.28  Rather 
than sending a clear signal regarding patentability the patent office 
has established that software may be patentable if it meets certain 
criteria, is claimed appropriately, and produces an economic result.  
No further guidance is provided to anyone.  Compounding this 
problem is the fact that the only case related to software patentability 
in Canada is from 1981 and it effectively held that computer programs 
are not patentable.29  Consequently, the disjunction between 
legislative, practical and judicial treatment becomes clear.  Statute and 
case law suggest that software is not patentable while the practical 
guidelines suggest that it may be patentable under carefully 
constructed circumstances.  In such a climate it is difficult to trust that 
an issued patent would be of any concrete legal value.  The result is 
what might best be termed a non-position.  There is no unified 
agreement with respect to software patents between any of the 
governmental bodies responsible for upholding our patent laws.  Far 
from clarifying the state of software patents in Canada the MoPOP 
guidelines simply created a great deal of breathing room for argument.  
What becomes evident is that legislative and judicial clarification of 
Canada’s official position on these matters is required specifically in 
light of the fact that MoPOP is merely a set of interpretive guidelines. 
 
1.4 The problem for parties 
 Given the complexity of understanding Canada’s position on 
software patents it should come as no surprise that this has substantial 
practical impacts on numerous stakeholders in the software industry.  
At least five interrelated groups and their interests are impacted by 
                                                          
27 Canadian Intellectual Property Office - Manual of Patent Office Practice”, February 
2010 at c.12.06.06b. 
28 Sam Frost and Ebad Rahman, “How to Protect Software Inventions”, (2007) 
Managing IP 53 at 53 online:<www.managingip.com>. 
29 Schlumberger Canada Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents, [1981] 56 C.P.R. (2d) 204 
(FCA). 
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the ambiguous results examined above.  First and foremost perhaps 
are lawyers who without further guidance are unsure of what is and is 
not patentable.  As a direct result they are unable to advise their 
clients in any meaningful and practical manner.   
Without clear direction from its legal representation the 
software industry in Canada doesn’t know how it should proceed.  
Filing a patent is an expensive process and without clear guidelines 
firms are unlikely to pursue this avenue of IP protection.  Worse still, 
due to Canada’s previously long standing exemption of software from 
patentability companies may still labour under the belief that this is 
the law.  The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that 
companies and their legal representatives may not discuss the 
implications of software patentability in other countries, such as the 
U.S. and EU, due to the influence of domestic confusion on the subject 
area as a whole.   
This has a trickledown effect on software developers and 
lower level employees within the software industry.  As this paper 
examines later companies do not appear to educate their staff 
regarding even basic intellectual property matters.  Knowing that 
software is often the compilation and modification of existing code 
this results in a problematic environment within which developers 
are unaware of even basic legal issues regarding the licensing and 
patent protection of publicly available works.   
Finally, given that MoPOP is the only source of true guidance 
in this area it is difficult to suggest that patent examiners have a clear 
understanding of what is and is not patentable in the software 
industry.   
 
1.5 Summary 
This section has established that there are issues with simply 
applying traditional patent law definitions to computer programs.  In 
exploring the impact of these issues through Canada’s existing statutes 
and guidelines it was shown that Canada has an uncertain and 
untested position regarding software patentability.  The lack of 
agreement between legislative, judicial and practical approaches to 
software patenting has a substantial impact on numerous industry 
stakeholders and legal professionals.  A substantial burden therefore 
appears to fall on the legislative and judicial bodies of Canada to 
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clarify the situation by responding to MoPOP’s guidelines.  In making 
these policy decisions it would appear worthwhile to investigate the 
responses and success of other countries with respect to software 
patentability.  The paper therefore turns now to just such a 
comparative exercise. 
 
 
2.0 LEARNING THROUGH COMPARISON 
This section looks to the laws and experiences of other 
countries with the objective of evaluating and learning from their 
experiences.  It begins with an examination of how TRIPS engages the 
issue of software patentability, thereby binding its signatories.  It then 
examines the paradoxically divergent approaches of the U.S. and EU. 
 
2.1 Requirements of TRIPS 
The objective of the TRIPS agreement, signed in 1995, was to 
harmonize the patent systems of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
members in order to facilitate the protection, trade and secure 
exchange of intellectual property.30  The agreement therefore binds 
Canada, the U.S. and EU nations as all are members of the WTO.  
With respect to computer programs article 27 (Patentable Subject 
Matter) of the agreement is most often cited as requiring that TRIPS 
signatories must extend their patent regimes to protect software.  This 
section states that “patents shall be available for any inventions… in 
all fields of technology provided that they are… capable of industrial 
application”.31 TRIPS also states, in article 10 that “computer 
programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as 
literary works (copyright) under the Berne convention”.32   
These two sections create an interesting internal contradiction 
with respect to software.  It has been argued that under TRIPS a given 
intellectual achievement should only attract one form of protection.  
Since TRIPS explicitly provides that computer programs are protected 
under copyright they shouldn’t be protected by patent law under 
                                                          
30 Daniel Gervais, The Trips Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1998) at 11. 
31 Supra note 4 at a.27. 
32 Supra note 4 at a.10. 
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article 27.33  The converse of this argument is that TRIPS simply 
provides a minimum level of protection under article 10 – permitting 
individual nations to decide what subject matter should be patentable 
under article 27.  On this view computer programs are more than 
simply lines of code but have functional aspects.34  TRIPS in and of 
itself therefore does not appear to definitively answer the question of 
software patentability.   
 
2.2 Development of U.S. Patent Law 
The U.S. approach to software patentability has been one of 
slow historical growth principally through judicial decision making.  
The case of Diamond v. Diehr is normally identified as the case which 
tilted the U.S. towards its pro-software patent stance.  In that case the 
Supreme Court held that “… an invention is not necessarily un-
patentable simply because it utilizes software”.35  More recently State 
Street Bank is viewed as entrenching and firmly establishing the U.S.’s 
acceptance of both software and business method patentability.36 
Like Canada the U.S. retains an exception for patentability in 
relation to pure mathematical algorithms but American courts 
interpret this exception very narrowly allowing software to be 
patented so long as it has any useful application.  U.S. and Canadian 
statutory law are therefore almost indistinguishable.  In addition, 
there is a striking similarity between MoPOP and the U.S. patent 
examiners guidelines, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
(MPEP), on the subject of software.  The substantial difference 
between Canada and the U.S. is that judicially the U.S. has seen far 
more treatment of patent cases at the Federal level.  The country has 
thus been able to establish a clear and well publicized stance on the 
matter allowing practical application of the legislation.  
The situation for the U.S. is, however, not devoid of problems.  
A rapid increase in software patent volume has resulted in an 
                                                          
33 FFII Workgroup 2004, “The TRIPS Treaty and Software Patents” 
online:<http://eupat.ffii.org/analysis/trips/index.en.html>. 
34 Miguel E. Sciancalepore, “Protecting New Technologies in Latin America: The Case 
for Computer Software Patents in Argentia”, (2006) 38 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 
349 at 375. 
35 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) at 177. 
36 State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (1998) 
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overtaxing of the USPTO.  The quality level of approved software 
patents is generally recognized as extremely low with a substantial 
number of patents being recognized as overbroad within the 
industry.37  Because patents are presumed valid it is extraordinarily 
difficult and expensive to overturn them.  As a result a variety of 
techniques have sprung up in the U.S. market to profit from this state 
of affairs - patent trolls being the preeminent example.  Trolls game 
the system by first obtaining overly broad software patents then using 
those patents offensively to induce licensing fee agreements from 
companies theoretically infringing the patent.  Companies submit to 
such extortion as the license fees requested are often less than the cost 
of fighting the patent.  The USPTO has moved to rectify these 
problems as of late by attempting to hire computer science graduates 
so as to improve its prior-art searches and obviousness examination 
procedures.38   
 
2.3 Development of EU Patent Law 
In the European Union (EU) patent law is governed by the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) which was developed by the 
European Parliament (EP) – a legislative branch of the EU.  Patent 
examination is performed by the European Patent Office (EPO).  The 
objective of the EPC was to harmonize the securing of patent 
protection across national boundaries in Europe.39  A patent granted 
by the EPO is therefore presumptively valid in every EU country.  
Nonetheless, individual countries are not bound by EPO decisions and 
are free to invalidate nationally challenged patents.40   
Article 52(2) of the EPC specifically excludes from 
patentability not only scientific and mathematical theories but 
programs for computers.  However, excluded subject matter under 
                                                          
37 Supra note 16 at 73. 
38 “Intellectual Property: USPTO Has Made Progress in Hiring Examiners, but 
Challenges to Retention Remain” General Accounting Office Reports & Testimony 
Newsletter (1 August 2005).  
39 Supra note 19 at 180. 
40 John Moetteli, “The Patentability of Software in the U.S. and Europe”, (Presentation 
for the Institut fur Europaishes and Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht St. Gallen 
Switzerland 28 October 2005) at 7 online< 
http://www.patentinfo.net/patentsearchersnet/download/THE_PATENTABILITY_OF
_SOFTWARE_IN_THE_US_AND_EUROPE.pdf>. 
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52(2) is subject to article 52(3) which states that exclusions only 
operate where the “…patent relates to [excluded] subject-matter as 
such”.41  Interpretation of the words “as such” has caused deep 
divisions between the EPC, EPO and EP for over a decade.   
Through its examination guidelines the EPO has voiced its 
opinion that the words “as such” are to be narrowly construed.  The 
EPO thus holds that “…while computer programs are excluded by the 
EPC, software is not excluded subject matter if it…. brings about a 
technical effect”.  The EPC then goes on to define technical effect as 
anything “achieved by the internal functioning of a computer… under 
the influence of a… program”.42  The effect is that so long as one 
claims the “use” of a computer program rather than the programs 
“method” the EPO will grant a patent for the software.43   
In 2005 the EPO moved to formalize this position through a 
bill before European Parliament.  The EP responded by throwing out 
the bill and re-iterating that software programs were not to be viewed 
as patentable subject matter.44  Since then the EPO has continued to 
approve software patents, but individual nations within the EU, 
namely Germany and the UK, have invalidated the patents challenged 
within their borders.45  Practically speaking this means that software 
is patentable in the EU but that such patents will not be upheld before 
national courts in the largest EU markets.  Echoes of the confusing 
Canadian situation are unmistakable, however, there appears to be a 
greater consensus between parliament and judiciary within the EU as 
compared to Canada suggesting that the EPO is simply acting as a 
renegade inside a system which generally opposes software 
patentability.  
 
                                                          
41 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC), European Parliament, 5 
October 1973 at 52. 
42 “The TRIPs Treaty and Software Patents”, (Paper for FFII Workgroup, 2004) 
online:<http://www.eupat.ffii.org/analysis/trips/index.en.html>. 
43 Canadian patent attorneys will be familiar with this logic as an adaptation of the 
method versus use claim approach to medicines.     
44 R. Hilty & C. Geiger, “Patenting Software? A Judicial and Socio-Economic Analysis” 
(2005) 36 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 615  at 
617. 
45 For an example of invalidation in Germany see 
http://ipgeek.blogspot.com/2007/11/german-federal-patent-court-invalidates.html. 
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2.4 Reconciling the Difference 
The solutions of the U.S. and EU are generally divergent with 
the U.S. taking a pro-software patentability approach and the EU, at 
least at the legislative and judicial levels, calling for non-patentability.  
These variations in approach become almost contradictory in light of 
the fact that the U.S. and the EU are both signatories to TRIPS.  The 
malleability of the TRIPS language effectively leaves nation states to 
their own devices in adopting or discarding software patentability.  
Therefore TRIPS, in and of itself, is of little assistance in helping us to 
clarify the Canadian state of affairs.  What we can conclude from the 
U.S. and EU evidence is that the involvement of the judiciary and 
legislative branches is critical in establishing, publicizing and 
solidifying a strong position regarding software patentability – 
regardless of which position is assumed.  This evidence, however, falls 
well short of helping us to establish a justifiable policy position.  In 
response the paper now turns to an examination of the academic 
discourse in this area in order to determine if legal theory can provide 
us with any clearer answers. 
 
3.0 INNOVATION OR SUBSTITUTION 
In this section a brief overview of academic discourse in the 
area of software patentability is undertaken.  Much of the literature 
reviewed originates in the U.S. as it is the principle world market 
which has adopted computer patents.  This provides Canada with an 
excellent test bed from which we can learn about the impacts of such 
an economic experiment.46   
  
3.1 Software Patents and Innovation 
The correlation between innovation and patentability is at the 
center of the software patent dispute and a great number of academic 
papers deal with this subject.  A summary of the literature in this area 
is perhaps best established by Robert Merges who states that despite 
initial concerns software “… patents have not killed software…. [but] 
this is hardly a ringing endorsement for the new regime.”47  
                                                          
46 Supra note 5 at 158. Bessen and Hunt describe the U.S. model as an experiment.  
47 Robert Merges, “Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings”, 
(2006) 85 Tex. L. Re. 1628 at 1633. 
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Unpacking the history of this statement serves as a good exploration 
of the innovation question. 
It was initially believed in the early 90’s that the introduction 
of software patents would shut down innovation in the software 
industry or concentrate power in the hands of only a few companies.48  
Empirical evidence over the last 15 years suggests this simply hasn’t 
happened – innovation and new market entrants continue to 
abound.49  Innovation incentives are regularly cited by the U.S. 
judicial system as the motivating factor behind the extension of 
patents to software.50  Though the innovation-patentability question is 
superficially simply, and attractive as a justification, drawing a 
conclusive link between the two has been a very elusive task.  Bessen 
and Hunt, for example, manage to positively correlate R&D 
expenditures with the number of patents a firm owns.51  
Unfortunately, they note that there are numerous other factors 
besides the incentive to innovate that may create this statistical 
association.52  Bessen and Hunt’s research is also criticized for its 
reliance on outdated information as well as its use of data from 
irrelevant industry sectors such as manufacturing.53  As a result even 
their limited findings have questionable application in a pure software 
market.   
In a less cautious paper Grant Yang concludes that software 
patent incentives motivate both small and large companies to 
innovate.54  However, his paper is based on second hand observations 
and pure theory rather than substantive research.  His conclusions are 
also directly disputed by ongoing statistical research conducted by 
Ronald Mann et al. which finds that patents are of limited or even 
negative value to start-up companies.55 
                                                          
48 “The League for Programming Freedom - Against Software Patents”, Letter to 
USPTO, USPTO (24, October, 1990). 
49 Supra note 47 at 1634. 
50 Supra note 16 at 44. 
51 Supra note 5 at 173. 
52 Ibid. at 184. 
53 Robert Hahn and Scott Wallsten, “A Review of Bessen and Hunt’s Analysis of 
Software Patents”, (2003) 
online:<http://www.researchineurope.org/policy/hahn_wallsten.pdf > at 2. 
54 Supra note 19 at 195. 
55 Ronald Mann & Thomas W. Sager, “Patents, Venture Capital and Software Start-
Ups” (2006) 36 Research Policy 193. 
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Historically the link between innovation and patentability has 
been seriously questioned and the same appears no less true in the 
current debate.56  As the basis for judicial treatment, and thus the US’s 
approach to patent law, the innovation argument is therefore suspect.  
Given the diversity of economic factors at play one of the only ways 
to confirm this causal connection is to undertake a contextual review 
and directly survey the opinions of industry representatives.57  Ronald 
Mann undertook just such a review in the U.S. and concluded that “… 
absent some other benefit all [software] firms would be better off 
saving the costs of obtaining patents”.  Once again this isn’t a glowing 
review of the regime adopted by our neighbors.  It does however lead 
to the question of whether patents serve some other function, besides 
as an innovation incentive, and whether the value of such a function 
makes software patentability worthwhile. 
 
3.2 Software Patents as Something Else 
The entrenchment of software patentability in the U.S., as 
well as the lack of conclusiveness regarding the innovation-
patentability question, has driven Mann, Merges and others in recent 
research to accept rather than fight the regime.  Instead of looking for 
justifications they now look to improve and explain the alternative 
value(s) created by its existence.  Most notably they have examined 
the value of patents in the venture capital process.  Venture capital is 
a particularly important element in bringing many software projects 
to market because innovation often occurs within small cash strapped 
companies who cannot afford the cycles of production and marketing 
which follow innovation.58   
In the venture capital sphere Mann has convincing and 
repeatedly established that venture capitalists consider patents to be 
one of a number of factors used to establish the investment value of a 
                                                          
56 “Debunking Software Patent Myths”, (1992) Communications of the ACM online< 
http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/6805/articles/int-prop/heckel-
debunking.html#NinePats>. 
57 P. S. Petraitis, A. E. Dunham & P. H. Niewiarowski, “Inferring Multiple Causality: 
The Limitations of Path Analysis” (1996) 10 Functional Ecology 421.  Mathematics 
and statistics are naturally limited in this manner, though there are techniques for 
modeling multiple causality issues.   
58 Supra note 19 at 196. 
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firm.59  In Canada anecdotal evidence suggests that the same is true, at 
least within the wider IP and venture capital fields, but that value 
differs substantially on a case-by-case basis.60  Thus, although venture 
capital has largely shaped the U.S. software industry its relationship to 
patents, like the innovation question, is dependant on a wide range of 
factors.61  This makes it difficult to establish any clear positive effects. 
The consequences of the U.S. patentability model have 
nonetheless been felt by the software industry.  Hunt notes that in the 
U.S. innovators who cannot afford to bring their products to market 
themselves will often resort to “… increasing their patenting in order 
to tax the rents earned on rival’s inventions and to mitigate similar 
behavior in their rivals”.  These two approaches are more generally 
known as the offensive and defensive use of patent portfolios.62  
Offensive use refers to the sword like use of a patent by a company to 
challenge a competitor via claims of infringement.  Similar to patent 
trolling offensive use requires firms to seek out targets and threaten 
legal action.  Defensive use refers to the functioning of patents as a 
protective shield used to hopefully mitigate the effects of offensive 
claims.  The entirety of this process, as noted in our discussion of 
patent trolls, is exacerbated by the issuance of overly broad patents.  
The end result is what has been termed the patent thicket.  A jumble 
of overly broad and likely invalid patents held up by software 
companies to shield themselves from the market effects enabled and 
permitted by the regime.63  Whether this result should be viewed as a 
benefit of the patent system is highly questionable.         
First-to-market advantages are a further component of the 
larger economic impact created by software patents.  The concept of 
first-to-market, also known as network effect, refers to the tendency 
in software for the first innovator with a publicly released product to 
become the market leader.  Network effects in the software industry 
                                                          
59 Ronald Mann, “Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?” (2004) 83 
Tex. L. Rev. 961 at 966. AND J. Allison and A. Dunn and R. Mann, “Software Patents, 
Incumbents and Entry”, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1580 (2007) 
60 Marc Castel “IP Barrier or Enabler to Innovation” (Presentation to Challenges in IP 
Class, 24 March 2008) [unpublished]. 
61 Supra note 47 at 1642. 
62 Robert Hunt, “When Do Patents Reduce R&D?” (2006) 96 American Economic 
Review 87 at 87. 
63 Supra note 16 at 83. 
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are intensified by at least two forces.  First, product development 
lifecycles are extremely short.64  Working products can be released 
within months.  Second, and in opposition, the issuance of patents is 
regularly an 18 month procedure – plenty of time for a competing 
company to develop and release a product thereby gaining an 
important market lead.65  As a result, diverting time and effort during 
R&D to patent ideas increases costs and reduces the ability to 
capitalize on the value of a first-to-market release.  Consequently, the 
unique features of the software industry and market suggest that 
patents have a dubious value in this regard as well. 
 
3.3 The Failure to Reconcile and Contextualize 
The forgoing has established that software patents don’t 
appear to have a clear connection with innovation.  So far as research 
can say there is at best a positive correlation between R&D and 
patenting activities.  The motivation behind such activities could be 
the result of numerous factors.  If patents are not serving as an 
incentive to innovate then a justification for their existence needs to 
be based on some other set of benefits.  Research into alternative 
benefits in the U.S. shows that they appear to have some value as 
alternative measures of a companies value and are thus sometimes 
beneficial in venture capital or Merger and Acquisition (M&A) 
situations.  Patents also enable companies to engage competitors 
through alternative business models based on offensive and defensive 
tactics.  Taken as a whole, even if these benefits were substantial, 
which they don’t appear to be, they would need to be corroborated in 
the Canadian context.  Keeping in mind these arguments the paper is 
thus lead, as was Mann, to consider contextual research as the solution 
to the inconclusive evidence presented thus far. 
 
4.0 EXAMINING THE CANADIAN CONTEXT 
Legal theory, statistical research and international approaches 
have provided us with no clear justification for a policy based decision 
regarding software patentability.  The objective of this section is to 
move beyond these theories and debates using practical and 
                                                          
64 Supra note 16 at 87. 
65 Supra note 10. 
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contextual Canadian evidence.  The hope is that this will allow us to 
more clearly define the elusive innovation-patent relationship.  In 
what follows profiles for three software development firms with 
innovation offices in Toronto are utilized as the basis for a 
contextualized profile of the Canadian software development industry 
and its relationship with patent law.66 
 
4.1 Three Case Studies 
Appendix A more closely examines the detailed responses of 
three Canadian software development firms to numerous questions 
about innovation and patentability.  The objective of this section is 
simply to summarize the basis, limitations and conclusions which 
emerged from this research.      
The company profiles available in Appendix A are based on 
personal interviews conducted and initiated by the author through 
industry contacts.  Great efforts were made to minimize bias and 
obtain data which is representative of a range of sub-industries 
(software systems, software tools, web technologies) from companies 
in a variety of developmental stages (privately funded, seeking 
investment, publicly traded) and of various institutional sizes (from 40 
to over 3000).  Due to the limited sample size is difficult to say that 
the three companies form a representative sample.  However, given 
the substantial agreement between them regarding the value of 
software patents it is argued that they serve as a valid starting point 
for understanding the Canadian context.   
The responses of firms exhibited the natural tendency to break 
down along five principle lines of discussion within which the impact 
of patents can be examined, mainly: innovation, use, value, cost and 
education.  With respect to innovation all three companies were asked 
whether they would continue to do business if software patents were 
unavailable.  They all responded that their businesses would continue 
to operate substantially as they do today regardless of the status of 
software patentability.   
On the topic of patent use only the U.S. based and largest 
company profiled admitted to the acquisition and defensive, but not 
                                                          
66 For privacy, business and legal reasons the identities of these businesses are not 
revealed.   
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offensive, use of patents in order to establish bargaining chips for the 
purposes of cross licensing.67  The other firms did not feel that 
software patents would serve any valid use in the software industry 
due to the impact of first-to-market factors.68    
Patent value and cost were highly interrelated in the minds of 
the firms interviewed.  The general consensus was that patents could 
provide valuable defensive protection in cross licensing agreements or 
infringement cases but that such value was generally outweighed by 
the cost of obtaining and maintaining a patent portfolio.  Alternatives 
such as circumventing patent claims or halting product development 
were viewed as more viable responses to infringement claims. 
Across the board the education of individuals regarding IP 
issues was found to be very low.  Again only the largest and U.S. based 
company had any formal IP instruction program in place.  At the 
opposite end of the short spectrum Company 1 was lacking even the 
vestiges of such a policy.69 
In summary, the consensus among companies was best put by 
the IP director of one firm who stated that “… software patents are 
primarily a cost, a burden and a distraction to our business…  [they] 
are an infrequent after-thought; our business focus is getting solid 
solutions to market first”.   
 
4.2 Alignment with Non-Innovation 
 The research suggests that all three companies would 
remain in business regardless of the status of software patents in 
Canada, or indeed the US.  To this extent their responses appear to 
echo the work and opinions of Mann who “… doubt[s] that legal rules 
granting protection have a sufficiently substantial effect to alter the 
course of innovation in either direction”.70  The Canadian responses 
are also in line with Hunt’s empirical research which concluded that 
“… growth in software patents may not be associated with an 
improvement in the incentives to innovate particularly in the [pure 
software] industries.”71  At best this describes a situation in which 
                                                          
67 See Company Profile 3 in Appendix A. 
68 Supra note 19. 
69 See Company Profile 1 in Appendix A. 
70 Supra note 59 at 966. 
71 Supra note 5 at 184. 
 119 
 
 
patents don’t contribute to innovation in any substantial fashion.  This 
raises the question of whether, through their establishment, 
additional positive or negative factors are introduced to the market by 
software patent regimes.   
Our exploration of the U.S. model as well as patent laws core 
tenets established that software patents are plagued with problems in 
practical application.  They have given rise to entirely new business 
models in the U.S. which at best have nothing to do with innovation 
and at worse impede innovation by exploiting the resources of 
companies that would otherwise invest further in R&D.  The claim by 
Company 1, that it would consider ceasing operations in the face of 
any substantial lawsuit, supports the view that patents may negatively 
impact innovation under certain circumstances.  In addition the 
USPTO has publicly recognized that its weak examination procedures 
have resulted in overbroad patents being issued.  The result for 
companies caught in infringement claims is financially significant 
whether they settle or dispute the claims.  Armed with this 
knowledge it becomes clear that if Canada does embrace software 
patentability it should be prepared for the additional burdens which 
will be placed on its patent examination officers and market 
players/innovators.   
Given the low innovation value ascribed to software patents 
by the companies interviewed the conclusion that the Canadian 
context supports non-patentability is well justified. This is specifically 
true in light of the potential downside risks, such as trolling, exhibited 
in the U.S. and echoed as concerns domestically. 
 
4.3 Patents as an Alternative Vehicle 
Research in the U.S. did show that patents could hold value 
for companies seeking investment capital.72  In such situations patents 
can be used as an alternative vehicle and measure of future market 
success.  Though this does appear to occur in the U.S. the same was 
not found to be true in Canada.73   
One company in the research panel was actively seeking 
investment capital and it did not see any substantial correlation 
                                                          
72 Supra note 59 at 966. 
73 Supra note 55 at 207. 
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between investment potential and its patent portfolio.74  This is again 
in keeping with Mann’s research and the impact of first-to-market 
effects – the view was that more profit could be obtained by adhering 
to a rapid innovation and release schedule and such a model did not 
mesh with the lengthy patenting process.   
The companies also dismissed or disliked the use of patents as 
defensive and offensive tools generally regarding it as a burden that 
caused them to stray from core business objectives.  As such the 
principle alternative benefits potentially derived from a patent regime 
do not appear to have substantial application in Canada at this time.  
Thus, as a policy position, the non-patentability of software again 
appears to be a justified response.   
 
4.4 The Education and Low Level Development Problem 
A critical phase in the M&A and venture capital processes is 
the inspection of IP holdings in order to establish potentially 
patentable ideas as well as to identify latent violations.75  The latter 
factor can be deeply impacted by the actions of low level developers 
on a project.  We have explored how the innovation lifecycle in 
software is an extremely rapid and incremental process that builds 
upon previous works.  Our research also established that IP education 
in the Canadian software industry is weak at best.  These three factors 
combine in a unique fashion creating the potential for patents to have 
a profoundly negative impact on business processes.   
It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which a low level 
developer begins development of a new cutting edge feature by 
searching for assistance on the internet.  She’ll probably find help in 
the form of publicly available though potentially licensed or patented 
software.76  Using this as her starting point she may then invest 
substantial time in the modification or extension of this code.  The 
end result may well be the incorporation of a licensed or even 
patented piece of code into the core elements of her work.  Most of 
                                                          
74 See Company Profile 2 in Appendix A. 
75 This came out in discussions with IP officers and legal staff for several of the 
companies profiled. 
76 Many software projects are protected under the GNU public license or another 
form of public licensing model.  These models normally prevent the use of code for 
commercial purposes. 
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the companies interviewed didn’t concern themselves with such 
issues at all.77  Others felt that the education of project managers was 
sufficient.78  Managers, however, admitted that they normally based 
their opinions on the time it takes a developer to complete a task.  But 
as the above example shows time is but one element of the 
development process - problematic code can be incorporated into a 
project inadvertently with little or substantial effort.     
The education problem therefore poses an additional 
downside risk for software companies in a patent based regime.  This 
risk is only theoretical and no direct evidence of problems was 
exposed through the research.  Nonetheless, it weights in favor of a 
non-patentability policy or in the alternative suggests that a clearly 
disseminated stance on software patentability is part of a fully 
functional and sound regime. 
 
4.5 Conclusions in the Canadian Context 
In the Canadian context the above review of theory and 
practice suggests that software patentability provides no significant 
advantages to companies as either defensive, offensive or investment 
tools.  The core question of innovation, though always difficult to 
answer conclusively, appears to be impacted little by the existence of 
software patents.  What has notably emerged through this practically 
grounded exercise are the downside risks of patentability to the 
software industry in Canada.  Given that there are no clear 
advantages, and that the EU generally operates successfully under a no 
software patentability regime, the negative impact of patents appears 
to tip the entirety of the ambiguous debate substantially towards a 
finding of non-patentability.  If the risk of implementing a software 
patentability regime results in the highly arguable positive results that 
have been explored but also brings with it, practically as well as 
theoretically, harmful elements then the suggestion that Canada adopt 
a non-patentability model with respect to software appears to be 
logically defensible.  The paper now turns to a formalization of this 
recommendation.        
 
                                                          
77 See Company Profiles 1 and 2 in Appendix A. 
78 See Company Profile 3 in Appendix A. 
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5.0 POLICY APPROACH AND CONCLUSIONS 
This final section provides some policy and process 
recommendations as substantiated by the theoretical, legal and 
practical investigations undertaken above.  The policy approach 
advocated is comprised of three main elements: clear assertion, better 
contextual research and non-patentability.  Should software 
patentability be the only viable regime for reasons beyond the scope 
of this paper suggestions are made regarding the implementation 
details of such a system. 
 
5.1 Canada Must Assert a Clear Position 
The chief suggestion made by this paper is that Canada’s 
policy regarding software patentability must be clarified.  Though our 
patent examination office has developed guidelines for software 
patent practitioners and examiners they are untested and as such are 
of limited real-world value.  The result has been a substantial degree 
of confusion in the software and legal industries regarding the 
requirements and state of software patents in Canada.  Based on the 
U.S. and EU models it is clear that a unified vision and approach to 
software patent law is required from the legislative, judicial and 
examination branches of the government.  The EU in particular 
continues to face challenges and debate in light of the rogue actions of 
its examination offices.  Canada faces a similar situation unless there is 
co-operation and agreement between all responsible parties.   
Beyond simply determining a clear stance on patentability the 
public assertion and dissemination of this position plays a critical role 
in the continued development of Canada’s software industry.  
Software patentability impacts low level developers and individuals - 
due to the ability to create code using readily available tools.  In 
contrast industrial patents are traditionally harder and more expensive 
to implement.  As a direct result there is an increased risk of 
infringement and litigation exposure within the public at large.  
Education on these subjects is therefore just as important as the 
decisions themselves.  
 
5.2 Additional Contextual Research 
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This paper has shown that the Canadian software industry 
appears to respond in unique ways to the patentability dispute.  
Unquestionably the research relied upon as the basis for these 
conclusions is limited – the three firms interviewed may not be a 
representative sample.  Nonetheless, the substantial agreement 
between these corporations suggests that an underlying theme and 
approach exists within Canada.  What this paper suggests is therefore 
valid on its face but requires further validation. 
In 2002 the CIPO undertook a similar examination of its 
MoPOP guidelines and in an effort to obtain contextual data issued a 
call for papers.79  An access to information request made in 2005 
showed that the only responses to this call were from big industry and 
large corporate legal firms.80  The bias inherent in this sample is clear.  
The conclusion is that in performing contextual research the 
legislature, judiciary and CIPO should not be satisfied with evidence 
from self selecting members of the industry.  A properly conducted 
and active research initiative is therefore advocated – a replication of 
this papers approach would be considered an appropriate starting 
point. 
A proactive research endeavor is further supported by the 
inconclusiveness of international laws, national responses and legal 
theory in the software-patentability debate.  This paper has shown 
that resolving these problems may only be logically justifiable if we 
look at the contextual response and impact to Canadian businesses in 
order to resolve the overall uncertainties which have been explored.      
 
5.3 Non-Patentability Approach 
The argument for a non-patentable software regime in Canada 
has been the focus of this paper.  The reasoned and pragmatic 
approach to this claim has proceeded in three identifiable phases.  
First the legal responses of countries and theoretical discussions of 
patent law were shown to be inconclusive.  Second, a research based 
investigation of the Canadian context was used to show that our 
industry generally sees little value in software patents.  Third, 
                                                          
79 See http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/pt_notice-e.html. 
80 In accordance with the Canadian Access to Information Act such requests can be 
made by individuals for government documents.  Details of the request and response 
can be seen at http://www.flora.ca/A-2004-00246/. 
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practical and theoretical negative factors were shown to be introduced 
into the market by software patent regimes.  It is argued that these 
negative aspects, in light of the virtually balanced and persuasive 
arguments which otherwise exist, are enough to support a logical 
decision favoring the non-patentability of software in Canada.  In 
short, and in Canada, the negatives which are potentially introduced 
outweigh the negligible positive impacts which were explored.  Under 
such an analysis there appears to be no logical justification for the 
implementing a software patentability regime in Canada at this time. 
 
5.4 Patentability Considerations 
If adopting a non-patentability regime should provoke 
substantial backlash in areas beyond the scope of this paper, such as in 
international trade, the results of this research and analysis still serve 
to establish some important points.  First, the goal of asserting a clear 
and unified position on software patentability remains critical to the 
establishment of practically useful laws and guidelines.  There is no 
substantial difference between U.S. and Canadian laws what 
differentiates them is the level of judicial involvement.  Nationally a 
high level of involvement has enabled the U.S. to establish a clear and 
well publicized stance on the matter allowing predictable and 
practical application of its legislation.  This level of involvement is 
required in Canada.  Second the undertaking of further contextual 
research retains value as it may provide further insight into the 
unique factors which shape the Canadian software industry and 
which should therefore guide any policy decisions. 
Beyond these re-affirmations we have seen that the U.S. 
model is not a cure-all which should be adopted whole heartedly 
without closer examination.  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 
2003 released recommendations of a similar nature stating that 
consideration of the harm to competition as well as the costs and 
benefits of implementation had to be considered before simply 
extending the scope of patentable subject matter.  The FCC also 
advocated for a contextual and economic learning exercise similar to 
that which is proposed above and which was undertaken by this 
paper.81  The FCC’s recommendations, coming from within the U.S. 
which is assumed by most to have an unshakable pro-patent regime, 
                                                          
81 Supra note 16 at 151. 
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serve to highlight the fact that software patentability is an ongoing 
international debate.  The papers examination of the EU model has 
also shown that a more limited acceptance of the software patent may 
be acceptable – so long as we make the position being adopted clear.  
What is principally objectionable is allowing the current state of 
uncertainly to prevail due to its wide ranging practical impacts.   
The extension of patentability to software may also have 
substantial impacts on CIPO.  This position was supported by our 
exploration of the USPTO’s problems with software patent 
examination and over breadth.  The resulting emergence of patent 
trolls and new market models in response to these problems are issues 
which require attention.  Klemens suggests that such issues may be 
overcome by additional patent requirements within the software 
application process including the filing of source code which should 
then be searchable by developers –   thereby substantially reducing 
uncertainty and search costs.82  In addition the problems created by 
patent thickets suggest that a new dispute process for patents may 
well be justified.  In fact, searchable data banks and new dispute 
mechanisms might be useful in other patentability fields such as 
chemistry or biotechnology.  As such software patents need not be a 
separate type of patent, but the requirements of usefulness, 
inventiveness and novelty may require that we adopt new 
documentation and submission policies across the board, or 
holistically, in order to accommodate new subject matter.      
 
5.5 Final Concluding Remarks 
Obtaining a consensus between the legislature, judiciary and 
CIPO on the subject of software patentability is no small objective.  
What this paper has hopefully shown is that Canada’s continued 
vague and untested approach to software patentability has significant 
negative real world impacts.  As a growing and important part of 
Canada’s economy the software sector requires stable practical 
guidance.  Through the approach of contextualized research the paper 
has overcome the inconclusiveness of theoretical and empirical 
research.  In addition it has attempted to reconcile and learn from 
international approaches.  Through this research lens an industrial 
environment which supports the non-patentability of software in 
                                                          
82 Supra note 16 at 151. 
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Canada has emerged.  The final result is both an approach and 
justified solution to the policy issues currently facing Canada with 
respect to software patentability.  The limits of this research have 
been made clear, but the effort of this paper was to establish a starting 
point for the discussion of this matter in Canada – something which is 
notably absent today.  In the process it has hopefully also added 
substantially to the existing debate and can act as a guide for future 
policy decisions in this area of innovation.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Company Profile 1 
Basic Profile 
The company is involved in the development of banking and wealth 
management software.  The resulting products are large scale 
institutional software programs for investment firms.  The company is 
privately funded as the side project for a much larger capital 
investment firm.  Among the firms interviewed its size is moderate 
with approximately 80 employees the majority of whom are software 
developers.  The companies principle clients are in the US.   
 
On Innovation 
The company sees itself as a transcriber of well established banking 
transaction rules into software.  Because of the nature of the generally 
accepted nature of these rules it considers itself generally immune 
from patent infringement.  As a result patents play no negative or 
positive role in the companies day-to-day affairs.  The company 
unhesitatingly responded that with or without software patents in 
Canada it would continue to develop software. 
 
On Patent Use 
The company holds no patents and has never been sued or approached 
regarding patent infringement during its 20 year history.  It therefore 
saw no use either offensively or defensively for patents in the 
software field.  When informed that the leading case on business 
method patents in the U.S. was related to banking transaction 
software the company, though slightly unnerved, dismissed the issue 
under the belief that software was not patentable in Canada.83  
Lawyers for the company noted this as a risk in the software industry 
generally and one which has been discussed with the company but 
not pursued.       
 
 
                                                          
83 Supra note 36. 
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On Patent Value 
The company perceived no value in software patentability.  Lawyers 
for the firm did perceive a negative value for the company should it 
ever face an infringement claim.  With no patent portfolio it would be 
unable to cross license and would have to settle or dispute the 
infringement claim.  Representatives conjectured that the company 
would likely cease operations if faced with any substantial patent 
lawsuit. 
 
On Patent Cost 
Software patents, as of yet, have not cost the company any substantial 
legal or licensing fees – though legal staff recognized this as a 
substantial area of liability given U.S. trends and the companies 
reliance on U.S. clients.  
 
On Education 
Lack of education regarding software patents became clear at two 
principle levels.  First discussion between legal staff and management 
for the company was minimal.  Furthermore, no discussion between 
management and development staff occurred regarding intellectual 
property rights and their products.  In order to obtain any useful 
information regarding patents the author was directed to speak with 
the companies outside legal council – no one within the firm felt they 
could answer the questions posed. 
 
Summary 
Having been in this sector of software development for over 20 years, 
the companies general approach is one which is frozen in that history.  
Events in the U.S. concerning the core of their business have not been 
considered seriously by legal staff or the companies management.  At 
best this places the company at risk of being pursued for patent 
infringement.  Though patents do not reduce innovation at this 
company on a daily basis licensing or lawsuits could cause the 
company to cease its practices entirely.  With no intention of 
changing its practices the company makes a clear statement in favor of 
software non-patentability.  
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Company Profile 2  
Basic Profile 
The firm develops applications for the interactive web 2.0 sphere.  
Their principle goal is to create engaging applications that are easy to 
use.  They distribute their products via telecommunication providers.  
The company is just over five years old and though it has proven itself 
stable has been looking for investment capital throughout its lifetime.  
Employing around 40 individuals it is the smallest and most rapidly 
moving company profiled.  It holds no patents and has never been 
approached regarding licensing or infringement.  The company 
performs work globally with clients in the EU and US. 
 
On Innovation 
The company considers itself a leader in innovative broadband 
technologies and device integration.  Though it understood the 
argument that patents could support innovation it does not operate in 
that fashion.  Innovation was seen as stemming from the cutting edge 
and rapid work of its development staff.  This was supported through 
income earned by being the first to market with products.  Over the 
years the company has continually adapted to market changes in 
order to keep that edge and to maintain profitability.  Without patents 
the company stated that it would continue to innovate and develop 
software in exactly the same way it does today. 
 
On Patent Use 
As innovators the company believed it could respond to patent 
infringement claims in one of two ways; either by circumventing the 
patent through the use of a different product or programming 
approach, or simply by dropping that line of business. As such patents 
were of no use either offensively or defensively to the company as 
they had no intention of entering into cross licensing agreements.   
 
On Patent Value 
The company perceived the value of patents to protect innovation but 
felt they were inappropriate for their business model for two reasons.  
First, the company felt it didn’t have the time or resources to devote 
to patenting its ideas.  Second, the patent process represents a time 
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hurdle both in terms of preparation and issuance.  Being first to 
market for the firm was the critical factor in survival and this wasn’t 
viewed as meshing well with the patent process.   
 
On Patent Cost 
Patent costs to the firm have been minimal.  Given their perspective 
on the ability to avoid or shed parts of their business that were 
infringing patents they also don’t perceive substantial costs arising 
from licensing or litigation. 
 
On Education 
Management had considered patent and intellectual property issues as 
they related to the company, but based on the feeling that patents 
were a non-issue had not disseminated information any further.  As a 
result development staff were not aware of software patent issues – a 
concern in cutting edge development where a great deal of code is 
open source. 
 
Summary 
More than likely this company could continue to operate as it 
imagines due to its diverse portfolio of ideas and products.  This 
therefore directly opposes the theory that patents stimulate 
innovation.  If anything patents would only cause this company to 
drop lines of R&D – not adopt new ones.  For a fast moving internet 
company patents were not perceived as providing any benefits. 
 
Company Profile 3 
Basic Profile 
The company has over 3000 employees and is publicly traded and 
commercially successful.  It is principally involved in the 
development of software tools for developers.  As such its investments 
in R&D are substantial and deeply technical.  The company is based 
out of California but after acquiring a smaller start up in Toronto five 
years ago it shifted much of it early stage R&D to Canada.  The 
company holds numerous software and business method patents 
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related to its products.  It has also been involved in several cross 
licensing and settlement related disputes. 
 
On Innovation 
Patents are viewed by the company not as something which promotes 
innovation but something which allows the company to fortify its 
position in the market.  The companies nature is to identify business 
problems and build solutions to those problems.  The overriding 
objective and focus is to deliver those solutions to market swiftly - 
patents are an infrequent after-thought. 
 
On Patent Use 
Representatives viewed the use of patents as primarily a defensive 
exercise in order to establish trading cards for cross licensing and 
infringement disputes with competitors and patent trolls. 
 
On Patent Value 
The company recognized that patents do enabled them to protect 
their R&D investments.  However, they did not view patents as a 
revenue stream, but rather as an additional layer of armor against 
lazier competitors who prefer to imitate rather than to create.  They 
also acknowledged that patents have a certain marketing value for 
customers who appreciate the notion of patented or patent-pending 
technology.  Patents were viewed more generally as a disruption to 
the core business focus of software development. 
 
On Patent Cost 
The company had spent a great deal of time streamlining its patent 
process in order to reduce application and settlement costs.  They did 
not believe that these costs had been fully offset by the value to the 
company of patents.  Defending against patent infringement 
accusations has cost the company substantially both financially and 
through lost development time.  The costs of patents were therefore 
viewed as necessary in the market place – an added cost of doing 
business. 
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On Education 
The company has a well determined policy of informing project and 
team managers about patent and intellectual property issues.  Team 
managers are then responsible for the auditing and validation of R&D 
efforts by their team.  Team leads said they normally didn’t bother 
development staff with IP concerns, but viewed themselves as 
involved enough to spot such issues. 
 
Summary 
With a department which handles IP issues this company clearly had 
the most mature and advanced approach to software patentability.  
The company attributed this both to its size as well as it U.S. 
ownership and headquarters.  Nonetheless, even though it sees itself 
as operating within a software patentability regime it generally 
disagrees with the burden and cost imposed by such a system.  As a 
software company it still sees itself as a small company surviving on 
rapid innovation and first-to-market successes.  Patents, even when 
necessary to defend against external forces, were not viewed as fully 
functional under such a business model.   
 
